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financial imperfections when a country is populated by heterogeneous agents with respect to their source of 
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tradable to nontradable sectors. Since the share of tradable sectors in aggregate GDP increases above its 
usual share with the devaluation of the currency, the individuals in tradable sectors pay more tax than what 
they receive as capital inflow in the expansion phase of the economy. The opposite holds for the 
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from taxation.  
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Distributional Effects of Boom-Bust Cycles in Developing Countries with Financial 
Frictions 
 
1. Introduction 
Inflation stabilization programs appeared to be one of the identifying features of 
developing countries in recent decades. These programs are initiated with the intention to 
reduce inflation and bring long run economic stability. However experiences of many 
developing countries suggest a pattern of boom-bust cycles associated with the 
stabilization programs. Countries implementing various sorts of stabilization programs 
are characterized by economic boom and sustained real appreciation, but later in 
stabilization episodes economic contraction takes place and programs come to the end 
with a “sudden-stop” associated with crisis. Experiences of Southern Cone Latin America 
(Argentina, Chile, Uruguay) in 1970s and early 1980s exactly fit to this common pattern, 
which is later in 1990s repeated by Mexican Peso Crisis and recently by Turkish and 
Argentine crises. 
The central objective of this paper is to unravel the distributional consequences of 
these boom-bust cycles inherent in many stabilization episodes. Hence, this paper 
provides a model to show that boom-bust cycles in developing countries lead to income 
redistribution from Tradable (T) to Nontradable (NT) sectors. The existing literature on 
stabilization programs is more concerned with explaining the reasons behind observed 
boom-bust cycles. However much less attention is given to the question of whether the 
stabilization programs have distributional implications as well. There are some empirical 
studies explaining the distributional consequences of stabilization policies. However 
there are not many theoretical models to address this issue. Hence this paper contributes 
to the literature by showing that temporary exchange rate stabilization programs can have 
zero cost for the country, but individuals in the country can be affected asymmetrically 
depending on their source of income. This paper also shows that the speed of capital 
outflow from the country affects the distributional consequences of the temporary 
exchange rate based stabilization programs. Moreover, this paper sheds light on the 
question of why the stabilization programs are adopted at the first place and later 
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continued even though they are believed to be temporary in connection with Aysan 
(2006).  
Aysan (2006) shows that even though exchange rate realignments are recognized 
to be temporary and inefficient, country may still implement them, because it allows 
redistribution of income among various groups. Here in this paper, we just model how 
stylized facts of boom-bust cycles in developing countries can generate redistribution 
from T to NT sectors. When individuals in NT sectors are politically more powerful than 
the individuals in T sectors, adoption of inefficient policies in favor of NT sectors can be 
a political outcome.  
The next issue is that if one of the reasons to adopt temporary policies is to 
redistribute income, why don’t countries implement redistributions directly in a more 
efficient manner? One possible answer is that by allowing inefficient policies politicians 
can hide redistributional aspects of new programs initially and win the public support 
when the policies are adopted at the beginning. In our model redistribution is realized 
over time. Initially, everyone benefits from the policy change but later the cost of 
previously adopted policies falls more on certain groups. Hence, if the individuals are not 
well informed about the consequences of new policies, inefficient temporary programs 
can help hide the income redistribution over time.  
In our model, we benefit from temporariness hypothesis and financial frictions to 
model redistribution. Temporariness hypothesis helps us account for boom-bust cycles 
and increasing NT to T output ratio before crises. On the other hand, financial frictions in 
the form of financial constraints and bailouts are employed to generate redistributional 
consequences of temporary policies.  
Stabilization programs are designed differently depending on the country 
characteristics, choice of policy instruments, and combined with structural reforms like 
privatization, financial market reforms. However, the exchange rate based stabilization 
programs seem to be more widespread mechanism employed to stabilize the economy. 
An examination of exchange rate based stabilization programs suggests the following 
regularities: 
(i) A boom in economic activity, consumption, investment and GDP followed by 
a later slowdown 
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(ii) Slow convergence of inflation to the devaluation rate 
(iii) Real exchange rate appreciation associated with a rise in the relative price of 
NT goods 
(iv) Deterioration of trade balance and current account balance 
(v) An ambiguous response of real interest rates depending on the orthodox or 
heterodox plan 
(vi) A boom in the real estate market 
(vii) Surge in capital inflows, especially in the form of bank lending in early 
stages of the plans that is later reversed with sudden-stop. 
Various models are offered in an attempt to account for these stylized facts. 
Sticky inflation due to adaptive expectations (Dornbush, 1982 and Rodriquez, 1982) and 
temporariness hypothesis due to lack of credibility (Calvo, 1986 and Calvo and Vegh, 
1993) still provide significant contributions to the research on the open economy 
macroeconomics. Later, fiscal policy induced wealth effect proposed by Helpman and 
Razin (1987) and Drazen and Helpman (1988) claims that reduction in inflation generates 
wealth effect and thus the economic expansion. Later attempts to explain the stylized 
facts emphasize the supply side effects that may result from removing the inflationary 
distortion on the labor supply (Roldos, 1993) or capital accumulation (Roldos, 1995 and 
Uribe, 1997). Each of these various approaches has some merits in revealing the 
mechanism behind stabilization programs. However as pointed out by Rebelo and Vegh 
(1996), no single hypothesis is sufficient to account for all empirical regularities at 
qualitative level. The only hypotheses that generate a boom-recession cycles are 
temporariness and sticky wages and prices hypotheses. 
In an attempt to account for disparities between theoretical models and empirical 
regularities, Calvo and Drazen (1998) focus on the role of uncertainty and incomplete 
contingent claim markets and illustrate gradual consumption boom. More recently, 
Mendoza and Uribe (2000) use a general equilibrium model of a two-sector, small open 
economy in which agents expect a devaluation and a switch to a higher rate of 
depreciation of currency and they show that risk of devaluation induces large distortions 
on wealth and relative prices in incomplete insurance market settings. Their model 
generates macroeconomic dynamics that mimic important features of stabilization 
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programs implemented in many developing countries. These recent attempts are 
remarkably important contributions to the literature because they not only better account 
for the quantitative regularities of data, but also draw attention to imperfect credit 
markets and collateral constraints (Mendoza, 2000-a, Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 
2000). 
Alfaro (2002) analyzes an endowment economy where temporary real exchange 
rate appreciation generates wealth effect in favor of the owners of nontradables. His main 
conclusion on redistrubutive effects of temporary stabilizations largely depends on the 
parameter values of the utility function and initial distribution of wealth. This paper 
offers an alternative model with more realistic representation of temporary stabilizations 
by considering financial frictions as collateral constraints and bailouts and governments’ 
response to crises as an increase in taxation.  
Due to the reasons stated above, the paper employs temporary nominal exchange 
rate reduction combined with financial constraints in an attempt to model the 
distributional consequences of exchange rate based stabilization programs for the 
individuals in T and NT sectors. The evolution of exchange rate based stabilization 
suggested by temporariness hypothesis is the following. The nominal exchange rate is 
reduced initially which is known to be reversed later in the program. These temporary 
reductions in nominal exchange rate implies that effective price of consumption is lower 
now as compared to the future in a cash-in-advance constraint economy. That induces 
higher consumption of tradables and this higher consumption of tradables is accompanied 
by higher consumption and production of nontradables. Higher demand for the 
nontradables increases the relative price of nontradables and leads to exchange rate 
appreciation. As the real exchange rate appreciates overtime, consumption and 
production of nontradables fall from its highest level gradually. When nominal exchange 
rate is reversed, the discrete fall in demand for tradables and nontradables occurs and 
nontradable production converges to its long run level over time. 
In Calvo and Vegh (1993) model, T sector is characterized as endowment 
economy and nontradables are produced in a sticky prices setting. Furthermore, 
investment is not explicitly considered in the model and thus, financial markets and any 
imperfections like liquidity constraints, collateral constraints, which later become a 
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subject for extensive research, are ignored in their model. This paper emphasizes the role 
played by financial constraints to explain how temporary stabilization programs can have 
distributional consequences for the economy. 
In our model, relaxation of financial constraints associated with rising value of 
nontradable production generates a boom in capital inflow for the country in the early 
stages of stabilization episodes. Financial constraints take two forms. Relaxation of 
international liquidity constraint escalates the capital inflow into the country. 
International investors do not directly invest in domestic firms. Banks emerge as 
intermediary mechanism to channel the international capital inflows to the individuals in 
the country. Similar to the international liquidity constraint, the banks use domestic 
liquidity requirements as a mechanism to screen the borrowers. Furthermore, government 
guarantees the loans of the international investors to domestic banks and repays their debt 
in case of systematic banking crises. In other words, state bails out the banks to avoid the 
collapse of the banking system.  
In our model, real exchange rate appreciation-rise in relative price of 
nontradables- increases the collateral value of the country and induces the international 
investors to invest more to the country. At the same time, the domestic banks have a 
similar liquidity constraint criterion to lend money to the prospective borrowers. The 
individuals with higher collateral in the form of higher income borrow more. The shares 
of nontradables and tradables in aggregate GDP play a crucial role in the distribution of 
international capital inflow. With the introduction of exchange rate based stabilization, 
the share of nontradables production in aggregate GDP increases due to surge in the 
nontradable production and prices of nontradables. This further implies that at the peak of 
economic boom, NT sectors increase their share of collateral value in total collateral of 
the country while the share of collateral value of T sectors declines.  Hence, NT sectors 
increase their share of borrowing in domestic financial markets during the expansion of 
economy. Therefore, timing of the international capital inflow is crucial for the 
asymmetric progress of T and NT sectors. In our model, the capital inflow takes place 
during the economic expansion starting with a discrete jump. This increase in capital 
inflow is later reversed to a capital outflow when international collateral constraint binds 
again at the bottom of contraction caused by the reversal of exchange rate based 
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stabilization program. With the announcement of the rise in nominal exchange rate 
(reversal of policy), we assume that all the banks collapse and the state bails out the 
banks by repaying their loans. The government finances the bail out by imposing a flat 
income tax at the bottom of economic contraction. However, when flat income tax is 
levied, the share of income from NT sectors in aggregate GDP is less than the share of 
NT sectors in aggregate GDP at the time when the capital inflow is carried out. Hence, 
NT sectors enjoy the benefit of expansion more than they suffer from the burden of 
taxation. On the other hand, T sectors also benefit from the stabilization program during 
the expansion of economy by receiving a fraction of total capital inflow, but in the 
contraction episode, T sectors lose more than they gain in the economic expansion.  
As a consequence, the exchange rate based stabilization policy can have a 
redistributive effect from T to NT sectors under financial frictions. The expansion in NT 
sectors exceeds the magnitude of later contraction. On the contrary, the net effect of 
boom-bust cycle on T sectors becomes negative at the end. This framework suggests 
redistribution from T and NT sectors where the temporary stabilizations are at work. In 
Calvo and Vegh model (1993), the cost of temporary stabilization program comes in the 
form of non-smoothing of the consumption. Other than consumption volatility, there is no 
cost for the economy, while output expands and contracts symmetrically. In our model, 
overall for the country, the cost of temporary exchange rate based stabilization can be 
zero but individuals in the country can be affected asymmetrically depending on their 
source of income.  
The outline of the paper is as follows: the next section first presents the 
benchmark model of temporariness hypothesis of Calvo and Vegh (1993) and later, the 
benchmark model is extended by including the international and domestic financial 
imperfections to point out the distributional aspects of the temporary plans for T and NT 
sectors; Section 3 concludes.  
 
  
2. The Model 
This section builds on a cash in advance, staggered prices model combined with 
temporary exchange rate reduction and financial constraints both in international and 
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domestic levels to account for above mentioned stylized facts and moreover to shed light 
on potential distributional consequences of temporary exchange rate policies. 
The economy is characterized by two types of individuals depending on their 
source of income. Each agent in the economy receives income either from T or NT 
sectors. We assume certain fixed cost that prevents the individuals to move between T 
and NT sectors to illustrate the redistribution better. The lifetime utility of each individual 
is given by: 
dttCVCU Tt
NT
t )exp()]()([0 β−+∫∞    (1) 
 
Where U and V represent the separable utility functions, NTtC  and 
T
tC  denote the 
consumption of tradables and nontradables at time t respectively and β is the usual 
discount factor. 
The budget constraints of the representative individuals in T and NT sectors at 
time t are: 
ttt
T
tt
NT
tt
NT
t rbmiCeCey −++= //   (2) 
ttt
T
tt
NT
t
T
t rbmiCeCy −++= /   (3) 
Where tb  and tm  denote the stock of real assets and money balances respectively. 
NT
ty  and 
T
ty denote the output of nontradables and tradables respectively, e indicates the 
real exchange rate–relative price of tradables in terms of nontradables and i is the 
nominal interest rate. Individuals are required to hold domestic money to carry out 
consumption, therefore the cash in advance constraint stands as: 
t
T
tt
NT
t mCeC ≤+ )/(α    (4) 
Where real monetary balances are positive function of consumption expenditures. 
Due to the positive nominal interest rate, i, individuals prefer to hold minimum monetary 
balances. By substituting equation (4), equation (2) and (3) can be rewritten as: 
tt
T
tt
NT
tt
NT
t rbiCeCey −++= )1)(/(/ α    (5) 
tt
T
tt
NT
tt
T
t rbiCeCey −++= )1)(/(/ α    (6) 
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Individuals maximize their utility function in (1) with respect to their budget 
constraints (5) and (6). By assuming r=β the first order conditions of this optimizations 
are: 
)1()( 1 t
T
t iCV αλ +=′    (7) 
t
NT
t
T
t eCUCV =′′ )(/)(   (8) 
 
Where 1λ  is the time invariant Lagrange multiplier of budget constraints (5) and 
(6). The model incorporates seignorage revenue for the government from money creation, 
which is assumed to be wasted to keep the model simple. The nontradables are consumed 
in the country and the equilibrium in NT sectors requires: 
NT
t
NT
t yC =    (10) 
 
Nominal interest rate is equal to real interest rate r plus devaluation rate, ε under 
perfect capital mobility assumption. 
tt ri ε+=    (11) 
 
For the sake of simplicity, supply of tradables is assumed to be exogenously given 
and constant. While NT sector operates under staggered price setting and supply is 
demand determined. Therefore staggered prices imply the following: 
0)( >Θ−Θ−= yy
dt
d NT
t
π    (12) 
 
which indicates that the rate change in inflation, π, is a decreasing function of 
excess demand, yy NTt − . Equation (12) asserts that the higher the excess demand at time 
t, the sharper will be the drop in the inflation rate after t. Equation (8) indicates that 
consumption of nontradables is a positive function of both real exchange rate and 
consumption of tradables. Therefore we can rewrite (12) as: 
)],([ Ttt
NT
t ceyydt
d −Θ=π    (13) 
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The real interest rate is defined as the relative price of tradables in terms of 
nontradables and thus written as NT
T
P
EPe =  where TP and NTP  are the prices of tradables 
and nontradables respectively. Therefore evolution of real exchange rate is the following: 
tt edt
de )( πε −=    (14) 
 
We can now address the main issues of the temporariness hypothesis. 
Temporariness hypothesis is based on the lack of credibility assumption. The policy 
makers announce a permanent reduction in the devaluation rate but the public believes 
that the reduction in devaluation rate will last for a certain period of time. The “present” 
is represented by time 0. Between time 0 and T the devaluation rate is believed to be 
lower and it will be back to higher rate at time T. So the public believes the following 
policy: 
Ttt <≤= 0for?εε    (15-a) 
Ttht ≥= forεε     (15-b) 
where t > 0 and hεε <?  
Equation (11) implies that during the transition period from 0 to T, the domestic 
nominal interest rate, i, is lower than after T. This induces higher level of consumption of 
tradables by first order condition (7) between time 0 and T. The increased consumption of 
tradables is supplied by trade deficit, which is later compensated by trade surplus after 
time T.  Therefore, initially the current account jumps into deficit as a result of surge in 
the consumption of tradables and the balance is restored at time T with a discrete fall in 
the consumption of tradables. At time T, the new steady state consumption of tradables 
must be less than the endowments of tradables to offset the earlier increase in the 
consumption of tradables. The fall in the consumption of tradables requires higher real 
exchange rate due to equation (8). The consumption of nontradables is shown to be a 
positive function of real exchange rate and consumption of tradables (equation (8)). Since 
the consumption of tradables jumps up at time 0 and fall at time T, the consumption of 
nontradables makes the same jumps given that real exchange rate is a predetermined 
variable and makes no discrete movements. The appreciation of real exchange rate 
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implies a decrease in the consumption of nontradables between time 0 and T. At time T 
consumption of nontradables makes a discrete fall and gradually increases as real 
exchange rate depreciates. At time 0 and at time T the jumps in the consumption of 
tradables must be accompanied by the same jumps in the consumption of nontradables 
because real exchange at a point of time is a predetermined variable, consumers do not 
want to change the consumption of nontradables relative to the consumption of tradables. 
The domestic real interest rate, dr , falls because inflation of nontradables declines by 
less than the rate of devaluation, ( πε −+= td rr ). At time T, the rise in i implies a jump 
in dr . Figures in the appendix show the evolution of the relevant variables. 
 
2.1. The Model with Financial Constraints 
So far, we introduced the temporariness hypothesis to account for the main 
features of the stabilization experiences of developing countries. Next, we will include 
financial frictions in the form of liquidity constraints into the model to show the 
distributional aspects of temporary exchange rate based stabilizations. The first liquidity 
constraint prevails at the international level. We assume that in international financial 
markets, investors regard the aggregate GDP of the country as criterion to flow their 
capital into the country and lend proportional to the GDP of the country. Given that debt 
to GDP ratio is still considered to be an indicator of the well-being of the economy in 
many occasions, this international liquidity constraint is not an unrealistic assumption. 
Hence, the international liquidity constraint is given as: 
critical
T
t
t
NT
t Iy
e
y ≥+ )(    (16-a) 
where criticalI  denotes the threshold level after which the country receives capital 
inflow and below which the country receives no capital inflow. criticalI  can be considered 
in a following manner: the country is already indebted and international investors do not 
give more credit unless the economy operates above its steady state level. The 
threshold criticalI  is a function of steady state income of the country. Therefore, countries 
with lower steady state income have higher threshold and subsequently receive less 
capital inflow in their expansion phases. If the economy is operating above its steady 
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state equilibrium, the country receives capital inflow proportional to its current output. 
When the current output falls short of steady state level, international investors react by 
withdrawing their capital from the country. The country receives )( Tt
t
NT
t y
e
y +θ (16-b) as 
an investment after the threshold level is reached. The above mentioned temporary 
nominal exchange rate reduction generates an expansion in the production of 
nontradables with the policy announcement. The output of tradables is considered to be 
given as a constant endowment and real exchange rate is a predetermined variable. 
Therefore, internatonal liquidity constraint, equation (16-a) is relaxed while NTty jumps 
upwards with the announcement of policy change. This further implies that the country 
can borrow now in international markets. Throughout the paper, we will assume that by 
the introduction of temporary exchange rate reduction, the country escapes from binding 
international liquidty constraint.  At time T,  as NTty jumps downwards, the country again 
runs into international liquidity constraint. However, between time 0 and time T, the 
country receives higher capital inflow. 
 
2.1.1. Endogenous Timing of the Devaluation 
We also change the above-mentioned model by introducing endogenous date of 
reversal of temporary exchange rate policy. In our model, the timing of nominal 
exchange rate devaluation is determined by the international liquidity constraint. When 
aggregate output of the country in terms of tradable goods reduces to its pre-stabilization 
level the international liquidity constraint binds again and the international investors 
recall their capital. This reaction of international investors triggers the crises at time T. 
The international investors do not suffer from the devaluation at time T.  The 
model incorporates the actual experiences of the stabilization plans such that international 
investors deposit their capital into the banks in terms of tradables and the repayment is 
made again in terms of tradables. Given that there is an explicit or implicit government 
guarantee on the deposits of domestic banks, international investors are immune to 
devaluation risk unless the government defaults. 
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2.1.2. Domestic Financial Constraint 
The model assumes that domestic banks play an intermediary role by borrowing 
in international markets and lending to individuals in the country without any transaction 
cost and profit.  However the banks employ a domestic liquidity constraint in their 
lending practices similar to the international financial constraint. Each individual is 
constraint to borrow up to a fraction of their current income, which seems to be an actual 
practice of many banks to screen their customers.  Hence domestic liquidity constraint 
takes the following form for the individuals in T and NT sectors respectively. 
0,)( >Φ≥Φ NT
t
NT
t L
e
y
    (17-a) 
0,)( >Φ≥Φ TTt Ly    (17-b) 
where NTL  and TL indicate the loan received by individuals in NT and T sectors 
respectively. Since the aggregate output of the country is sufficient to exceed the 
threshold level such that the international liquidty constraint does not bind, the surge in 
the international capital inflow tCI  at time t, between time 0 and time T is given by: 
)( Tt
t
NT
t
t ye
y
CI +=θ    (18-a) 
 
Thus, the country receives the following capital inflow between time 0 and time T 
for r=0: 
∫ =+T Tt
t
NT
t CIdty
e
y
0
)(θ    (18-b) 
 
The capital inflow is transferred to the domestic financial system through the 
banks. Since the banks use the income as a screening mechanism to allocate their funds to 
their customers, the individuals in T and NT sectors receive this capital inflow, CI , 
proportional to their share in aggregate income. Thus, the following shows how the 
capital inflow is distributed between T and NT sectors at time t between time 0 and time 
T. 
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tT
tt
NT
t
t
NT
t S
yey
ey =+/
/      (19-a) 
 
NT
t
T
tT
tt
NT
t
T
t SS
yey
y −==+ 1/    (19-b) 
 
where NTtS  and 
T
tS  denote the shares of NT and T sectors in aggregate GDP at 
time t respectively.  Therefore individuals in T and NT sectors receive t
T
t CIS  and 
t
NT
t CIS at time t. The important point here is that the shares of T and NT sectors in GDP 
evolve over time.  Due to the expansion in NT sectors with the announcement exchange 
rate plan, the share of nontradables jumps up to its peak and decreases gradually over 
time. Therefore, the NT sectors receive more capital inflow during the transition period 
(0,T) as compared to the case when the country receives capital inflow while operating at 
its steady state or the case that the current income is not used as a screening device in the 
domestic financial markets. Consequently, the temporary nominal exchange rate 
reduction plays a role in the distribution of international capital inflow in the country by 
changing the shares of T and NT sectors in aggregate output. 
By the reversal of exchange rate policy at time T, the output of nontradables 
makes a discrete decline and falls below to its steady state and then increases gradually as 
real exchange rate depreciates over time. By time T, international liquidity constraint 
starts binding again and international investors stop lending and even recall their loans. 
This triggers a discrete devaluation such that the domestic banks run into a financial 
distress as the customers of these banks face difficulties to fulfill their repayment 
obligations. 
To simplify the model, we first assume that the banking sector collapses without 
collecting its loans and subsequently government comes to bail out the banks and carries 
out the repayment obligations of the banks to international investors. We will discuss the 
case where the banks collect some of their loans in the following section, but this 
assumption does not change the main idea of the distributional consequences of the 
model. At time T, the government levies a flat income tax to cover the cost of bail out of 
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the domestic banks. Therefore, the total tax collection must be equal to CI (equation 18-
b) plus the interest cost. For the simplicity, the international interest rate is assumed to be 
0. The flat income tax lasts from time T to time T2. The duration of taxation depends on 
the speed of withdrawal of international investment. If the international investment is 
recalled at a point of time, the government imposes a tax at that point of time to carry out 
the debt obligations of the banks. Therefore, the speed of capital outflow is crucial to 
determine the burden of taxation on T and NT sectors. For example, if all the 
international debt is recalled at time T, when devaluation takes place, the individuals in 
NT sectors pay less tax than the usual times because their share in aggregate income is 
the lowest at time T as compared to other times as a result of discrete fall in the 
production of nontradables at time T. 
Thus, the tax rate is given by the following equation: 
∫ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +
=
2
tax
T
T
T
t
t
NT
t dty
e
y
CI    (20) 
The individuals in NT and T sectors, therefore, pay the following taxes 
respectively: 
∫ 2 taxTT
t
NT
t dt
e
y
   (21-a) 
∫ 2 taxTT Tt dty    (21-b) 
 
 
 
Proposition 1:  
The tax paid by individuals in NT sectors between time T and T2 is less than the capital inflow they 
receive between time 0 and time T. Similarly the tax paid by individuals in T sectors between time T and 
T2 is greater than what they borrow between time 0 and time T. Hence, the model generates income 
redistribution from T to NT sectors. 
 
Proof: 
The second part of the proposition is easier to show because the income of the 
individuals in T sectors is constant. We want to show that the following inequality holds: 
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∫∫ ≤ 2 tax0 TT TtT tTt dtydtCIS    (22) 
 
The LHS of (22) shows the amount capital inflow received by individuals in T 
sectors between time 0 and time T. The RHS is equal to the amount of taxation paid by 
the individuals in T sectors between time T and T2.  Substituting (18-a) and (20) in (22) 
we can rewrite (22) as: 
dtydty
T
T
T
t
T T
t ∫∫ ≤ 2 tax0 θ    (23) 
  
To simplify the proof, the duration of the capital inflow and the duration of 
taxation are assumed to be equal. Then if θ≥tax , the individuals in T sectors pay more 
tax than what they receive as capital inflow. Upon substituting (18-b) into (20), equation 
(20) can be rewritten as: 
tax
dty
e
y
dty
e
y
T
T
T
t
t
NT
t
T
T
t
t
NT
t
=
+
+
∫
∫
2
][
][
0θ      (20-a) 
 
Since t
NT
t ey / , between time 0 and time T, is greater than t
NT
t ey / between time T 
and T2 thus, ∫∫ +≥+ 2 ][][
0
T
T
T
t
t
NT
t
T
T
t
t
NT
t dty
e
ydty
e
y
 in (20-a) then the θ≥tax so the individuals 
in the T sectors pay more tax than what they receive as capital inflow. 
The first part of the proposition follows from the second part of the proposition. If 
the individuals in T sectors pay more than they receive, the individuals in NT sectors 
receive more than they pay given that the total capital inflow is equal to the total tax 
collected. 
The duration of tax payment exaggerates the distributional effects the model. So 
far we assume that temporary stabilization program lasts between time 0 and T and the 
tax is also collected in the same time length. However if the tax is collected in a shorter 
time period, T2 - T < T, the burden of taxation falls even more on T sectors. 
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Proposition 2: 
 if the tax is collected in a shorter time period, T2 - T < T, the burden of taxation falls even more on T 
sectors. Similarly, since the taxation at time t is equal to the capital outflow at time t, we can restate the 
proposition by the following: if the capital outflow takes place in a shorter period of time then the 
burden of taxation falls even more on the individuals in T sectors. 
 
Proof: see the appendix for formal proof.  
 
Table 1: Time Before  O  
 
Between 0 and T T Between T and 
2T  
  Exchange rate 
based 
stabilization 
starts   
 Exchange rate 
based stabilization 
ends 
After the 
devaluation  
   
Discrete jump in 
the production of 
nontradables 
 
Jump in the share 
of nontradables 
secor  
 
Relaxation of 
financial 
constraints  
 
Appreciation of 
real exchange rate  
 
Nontradabales 
production 
decreses gradually 
from its peak 
 
Relaxation of 
financial 
constraints 
 
Discrete fall in the 
share of 
nontradables 
 
 
International 
liquidity constraint 
binds 
 
Banking Crisis 
 
Government bails 
out the banks 
 
Government levies 
tax to carry out bail 
out expenditure 
 
Depreciation of 
real exchange rate  
 
Production and 
share of 
nontradables 
incrseses gradually  
 
Individuals bear the 
burden of tax 
proportional to 
their current 
income 
An Example: The 
shares of T and 
NT sectors in 
aggregate GDP  
NT
tS  
T
tS  
NT
tS  
T
tS  
NT
tS  
T
tS  
NT
tS = 
tax 
burden 
T
tS = 
tax 
burden 
NT
tS = 
tax 
burden 
T
tS = 
tax 
burden 
% 50 50 60  40  60…50 40…50 40 60 40…50 60…50 
 
 
 17
3. Conclusion 
This study sheds light on the distributional implications of the exchange rate based 
stabilizations in a heterogeneous agents setting with financial imperfections. The model 
suggests redistribution from T to NT sectors. The literature on the exchange rate based 
stabilizations assumes homogenous agent economy. As a result, the distributional 
consequences of the temporary policies are not well addressed in the literature. This 
paper attempts to build this gap by considering heterogeneous agents with respect to their 
source of income. The heterogeneous agents assumption is more realistic given the fact 
that individuals receive their income either from T sectors or from NT sectors. Moreover, 
the income shares of T and NT sectors in aggregate GDP evolve over time.  
The model is based on the stylized facts of the temporary exchange rate based 
stabilization programs. With the introduction of the temporary program, the share of NT 
sectors in GDP jumps up to its highest level and during the expansion of the economy, 
the share of NT sectors exceeds its pre-stabilization level. Moreover, the country receives 
capital inflow in its expansion period due to the relaxation of the international financial 
constraints. This international capital inflow is distributed to the individuals in T and NT 
sectors proportional to their current income by the domestic banking sector. Therefore, 
the individuals in NT sectors increase their share in domestic borrowing as compared to 
the usual times. Exactly the opposite holds for T sectors. The timing of the collapse of the 
exchange rate based stabilization program is determined by the international financial 
constraint when the aggregate output of the country falls below a certain threshold. After 
the devaluation of the domestic currency takes place, the international investors recall 
their capital inflows from the domestic banks. The banks suffer from difficulties to carry 
out repayment obligations due to the currency crisis. The government comes in and bails 
out the domestic banks by paying the debt of the banking sector to the international 
financial markets. The burden of bail out expenditure falls on the individuals in the 
country due to the imposition of the flat income tax. Since the share of T sectors in 
aggregate GDP increases above its usual share with the devaluation of the currency, the 
individuals in T sectors pay more tax than what they receive as capital inflow in the 
expansion phase of the economy. On the other hand, the opposite holds for the 
individuals in NT sectors who gain more from the capital inflow as compared to what 
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they lose from taxation. Consequently, when individuals receive their income either from 
T sectors or from NT sectors, the temporary exchange rate based stabilization with 
financial market imperfections generates adverse distributional consequences for the 
individuals in T sectors. 
 
Appendix 
Proof of proposition 2: 
To show that the burden of taxation on the individuals in T sectors increases as the time length to collect 
the tax shortens; we need to prove the following: 
0
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 (A-1) 
after  taking derivative (A-1) can rewritten as:  
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and from (20-a) 
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since 0≤A , for   (A-1) to be satisfied; 0≥B  
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cancels each other in (A-6),therefore (A-6) can be rewritten as: 
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